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Stanley Hoffmann’s biography and scholarship transcend multiple divides and defy 
easy classification. His theoretical approach to international relations was eclectic in 
that it could not easily be described as either realist or liberal, as noted by Joseph Nye 
and others (Lambert 2007; see also Hall 2017). His teaching ranged across 
international relations, political history, French politics, and social and political thought. 
A central aspect of his work was a constant dialogue between domestic and 
international politics, empirical political science and political theory, and between 
France and the United States, where one country often served as a reference point for 
observations about the other, as in Hoffmann’s essays about nationalism (Hoffmann 
1993 and 1998). This sense of transcending divides could also be said to characterize 
Hoffmann’s position in relation to the role of being an academic and a public intellectual. 
Being able to examine issues from multiple perspectives, effectively both as an insider 
and as a semi-outsider of sorts, rooted both in France and the United States, enabled 
Hoffmann to develop a distinctive approach to the study of politics and society that 
combined familiarity, empathy, and detachment (Hoffmann 1974: xi). In the preface to 
his collaborative book on the Iraq war, Hoffmann says: ‘Nevertheless, I have resigned 
myself to an ambiguous condition: someone whom his nature, his choices, and his fate 
have made marginal in almost all possible ways, neither fully integrated in an America 
which, except for New England, remains largely unknown to me but not belonging either 
really to France whose daily life I have not shared for many years’ (Hoffmann 2004: 
vii). Many observers have noted how intimately Hoffmann’s scholarship was bound up 
with his own biography – or as Hoffmann himself remarked in a memoir of his 
childhood, ‘It wasn’t I who chose to study world politics. World politics forced 
themselves on me at a very early age.’ 
Unlike many other commemorations of Stanley Hoffmann that have primarily 
focused on his significant contributions as a teacher, institution builder and mentor 
(see e.g. Hall 2017), this article gives pride of place to Hoffmann’s scholarly, 
intellectual and ethical contributions. Given the prominence of the liberal tradition in US 
political science at least through the 1980s, when a synthesis of neo-realism and 
neoliberalism led to an acceptance of most structural-realist assumptions within 
international relations, one could even say that he started within the mainstream. He 
was a man of his time, attentive to the early manifestations of the process of European 
integration while rejecting world government and other alternatives to the 
nation-state form as mere successors to external domination, at a time when 
decolonization in the name of sovereignty had so recently paved the way to freedom 
across much of the globe (Hoffmann 1986: 7). Indeed, he would later describe his PhD 
dissertation, Organisations internationales et pouvoirs politiques des Etats, as “a wild 
call for overcoming sovereignty” (Hoffmann in Miller and Smith 1993: 9). As a 
consequence, when structural realists became hegemonic in the field in the 1980s, 
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they would tax Hoffmann with a typically liberal, contradictory struggle for cooperation 
between nations beyond power politics, dismissing his efforts to overcome the state as 
a political organization and his praise for interdependence and influence beyond force 
(See for instance Jonathan Haslam’s harsh criticism along these lines. Haslam 2002: 
220-221, 226-227). In the last decades of his career, Hoffmann also exhibited decidedly 
Kantian inclinations, emphasizing ethical imperatives, not least in relation to human 
rights (Keohane 2009). This ethical turn was consistent with his broader discomfort with 
realist thinking.  
If Hoffmann was never strictly a “realist,” nor was he in the camp of radical 
critics like Noam Chomsky or leftwing critics of American foreign policy in France. (See 
Chomsky 1969a, 1969b; and Hoffmann 1969, for a sense of their disagreements). 
Revisiting the debate between proponents of nuclear deterrence and abolitionists in 
1985, envisioned in terms of a struggle between ‘traditionalists’ and ‘radicals’, 
Hoffmann would acknowledge that “I am a traditionalist in case you didn’t know it” 
(Hoffmann 1986: 5). Indeed, as his student, friend, and collaborator Robert Keohane 
has pointed out, there is something rather modest or conservative about the kind of 
analysis and critique that Hoffmann provides (Keohane 2009: 370). He had only limited 
sympathy with Marxian critical theory and dependency approaches (see Hoffmann 
1977). Marxists and critical theorists would probably trace this “conservatism” to 
Hoffmann’s belief in the power of ideas and accommodation with existing power 
structures in world politics and academia. Post-structuralists, feminists, and post-
colonial scholars might well regard him as a rationalist who ended up entrenching the 
politics of knowledge of hegemonic, white, Ivy-League America. Hoffmann was 
certainly not a revolutionary. 
In this essay, we argue that as a scholar, a teacher, and a public intellectual 
Stanley Hoffmann was consistent in staking out a territory of thoughtful liberal critique. 
The strengths and limitations of his outlook are those of the liberal tradition itself. His 
distance from realism and the temptations of power saved him from being absorbed 
by the National Security State, while his skepticism towards narrow and rigid leftist 
pieties drove him to reach out to broader audiences (from Vietnam to the Iraq War) in 
his advocacy of a moderate and sane foreign policy. In so doing, he also defended the 
contribution of the humanities to the study of international relations in a way that is 
perhaps even more urgent today. This includes a strong case against monolingualism 
and monocausal grand explanations, which can be seen as important limitations of 
contemporary social science and international-relations scholarship, especially in the 
United States.  
 
 
Policy relevance beyond US policymaking elites 
 
Unlike a number of other European émigrés to the US of his generation who at various 
times figured amongst his colleagues at Harvard, Stanley Hoffmann seems never to 
have entertained the possibility of becoming directly involved in policy-making in 
Washington, DC. While Henry Kissinger, Zbigniew Brzeziński, Francis Bator, and even 
the historian Richard Pipes served either for longer or shorter periods (as did US-born 
colleagues, like Samuel Huntington and Joseph Nye), Hoffmann does not appear to 
have felt this temptation. Nor did he get involved in militarized Cold War social science 
research. This is quite exceptional in the context of Cold War social science, perhaps 
especially at Harvard (Solovey and Cravens 2012; Rhode 2013). While Hoffmann wrote 
approvingly of some of Kissinger’s historical writings, he was critical in many respects 
of Kissinger’s record as a policy-maker. In a discussion of Kissinger’s attempts to shape 
world order, Hoffmann argues that ‘the lesson from Kissinger's attempt should be, not 
that world order policy is wrong, but that that particular one was both too arrogant and 
too tight, too much made-in-Washington and too obsessed by stability to succeed’ 
(Hoffmann 1976-77: 107). In a comparative discussion of Kissinger and Metternich, 
Hoffmann highlights the pitfalls of overestimating the power of charismatic individuals 
to shape policy and the many challenges confronting US leaders that stemmed both 
from bureaucratic capacity and from domestic constraints on foreign policy-making 
(Hoffmann 1972). The proximity of international-relations scholarship to the corridors of 
power – indeed even the ‘kitchens of power’ (Hoffmann 1977: 49), as academics-
turned-policy-makers participate in the exercise of power and formulation of policy – 
too often meant that the ideal of dispassionate and objective analysis was undermined 
in the process. In other words, ‘the closer the Washingtonian connection, the greater 
the temptation of letting oneself be absorbed’ (Hoffmann 1977: 56; see also Hoffmann 
1986: 2). In an early article discussing the scholar’s vocation, Hoffmann affirms that 
‘his duty is to seek knowledge and understanding for their own sake; and this implies 
that the main purpose of research should not be “policy scientism”’ (Hoffmann 1959: 
349; Hoffmann 1957). There is a risk that academic analyses are shaped by the 
scholars’ desire to be relevant to policy concerns and even to earn the right to 
participate themselves, if not directly in government, then in the para-governmental 
foundations responsible for funding their research (Hoffmann 1977: 50; for a focused 
analysis of this problem, see Solovey 2013). 
The question of policy relevance and the relationship of scholarship to policy-making 
remains controversial, especially in the subfield of international relations. Hoffmann 
has argued that the proximity of American academia to the corridors of power in 
Washington, DC has often compromised international relations as a field (for a focus 
on security studies and self-censorship, see Pelopidas 2016). However, despite his 
misgivings about direct involvement with the world of policy- making, Hoffmann’s work 
spoke to policy in at least two ways. 
First, many of Hoffmann’s writings straddled the divide between scholarship and public 
commentary. His numerous publications in journals like the New York Review of 
Books, Foreign Policy, Foreign Affairs and Daedalus testify to his ambition to reach a 
wider audience and contribute to popular debate, notably by elevating it and offering 
nuanced and dispassionate analysis of key issues. These articles often addressed 
current affairs, such as the foreign policy of the Carter administration, or offered 
interpretations of topical issues, like globalization (Hoffmann 2002). Hoffmann’s ideal 
reader was the public intellectual, which included two political communities: France 
and the US, as well as citizens, some of whom had the privilege of being his students 
(Hoffmann 1986: 17). For him, teaching, scholarship and political commentary were 
necessarily complementary aspects of his activity as a public intellectual. Peter Hall 
cites him as giving the following advice to students: “as scholars and as citizens 
working in a field in which violence, deceit, injustice and oppression are in full display, 
beware of illusions, but never give up hope – by which I didn’t mean a faith in progress, 
only the modest belief that it is not impossible.” (Cited in Hall 2017) This piece of advice 
illustrates Hoffmann’s belief in the individual as an agent of progressive change, but 
change of a limited kind; his fear of political voluntarism led him to advocate moderation 
as a response to the two great ideological projects of the twentieth century, fascism and 
communism. It also shows that his audience is both composed of his students and of 
citizens of a political community, past, present and in the making. 
Second, true to important strands in the French political tradition, he also 
perceived the intellectual’s responsibility to speak out when fundamental issues were 
at stake (Hazareesingh 1994, chapter 2). This moderate stance took a lot of personal 
and professional courage at critical times. His early critique of the US involvement in 
Vietnam on realist rather than moral grounds, in a Spring 1965 debate with then US 
Defense Department official Daniel Ellsberg, is too famous to be recounted again 
(Paisner 1965). We will focus on three instances: his admiration for Raymond Aron 
over time, the intellectual turn towards nuclear weapons in France in the early 1980s, 
and the 2003 controversy about the Iraq war and the French veto at the UN Security 
Council, perhaps best encapsulated by the book of interviews with French historian 
Frédéric Bozo (Hoffmann 2003). 
Hoffmann’s admiration for Raymond Aron is well established (inter alia, 
Hoffmann 1983a, 1983b, 1985).2 He wrote a long and warm obituary for the New York 
Review of Books when his mentor passed, but he never was a blind follower. In the 
1970s, when Aron turned to the neo-conservative right,3 Hoffmann distanced himself. 
Even in the obituary, he writes of Aron: “[I] have reached, on many occasions, 
conclusions different from his own (I was a Mendèsiste, later a Gaullist, and my views 
of nuclear strategy and of American diplomacy are not at all those Aron held in his last 
years.)” (Hoffmann 1983b). The Aron he praised the most is the earlier one, the 
Renaissance man for whom the sense of the tragic in history does not yet fully mean 
embracing conservative politics. In an assessment of Aron’s contributions to 
international relations, Hoffmann largely sidesteps this conservatism, though he hints 
at it by acknowledging some differences of opinion, most notably, by criticizing Aron 
for having ‘curbed his Kantian inclinations – too much for my own taste’ (Hoffmann 
1985: 
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21; see also Hoffmann 1957: 921-923 for an early critique of the conservative effects 
of the claim of value-neutral objectivity in the social sciences). 
The “new philosopher” and intellectual gadfly André Glucksmann’s 1983 book 
on nuclear deterrence, La force du vertige, enjoyed night-unanimous praise in the 
French media, with the exception of the communist press and the Canard enchaîné. 
This publicity coup followed a trend of accommodation with militarization and nuclear 
weapons among the French intelligentsia (Hoffmann 1984: 386; Gorand 1984: 389). 
Amidst an overwhelmingly favorable reception of the book, Stanley Hoffmann ridiculed 
its melange of literary pretension and techno-fetishist enthusiasm for the Bomb, which 
resulted in turning the warhead into the main subject of History. The title of Hoffmann’s 
review, “le presque rien et le n’importe quoi,” exceeded his usual moderate touch and 
treated that as a French ideology (Heuser 1998 chap. 5; Pelopidas 2012). Of course, 
one could claim that here Hoffmann is simply being a good member of the American 
“strategic community,” which believes in empirical quantification of damage rather than 
lyrical speculations. He himself admits to this to a degree (387). But at a time when 
French intellectuals had largely abandoned the field of nuclear critique, embraced 
nuclear deterrence as the insurmountable horizon of our times, and focused on 
“pacifism” as the new enemy (Anderson 2017), it is worth remembering Hoffmann’s 
warning: 
Européen moi-même, je partage la révulsion pour la guerre conventionnelle exprimée par André 
Glucksmann. Si la dissuasion nucléaire était une panacée, une garantie parfaite contre une 
telle guerre en Europe, je serais d’accord avec lui. Mais la foi dans cette dissuasion-là est 
devenue en France l’équivalent de la foi dans la ligne Maginot. Et c’est cela qui est inquiétant. 
(Hoffmann 1984: 387; see also Hoffmann 1985: 18-20; 1986: 13) 
He offered a very lucid assessment of the militarization of French intelligentsia at the 
time (Anderson, 2017): 
Il raisonne comme si la seule force capable d’ébranler la dissuasion était le pacifisme, sans 
comprendre que celui-ci, en Allemagne comme aux Etats-Unis, est dans une très large mesure 
non une capitulation devant la menace soviétique, mais une réaction fort sensée de gens 
horrifiés par l’escalade des moyens, par les propos officiels sur la possibilité de mener et de 
gagner des guerres nucléaires. (Hoffmann 1984: 387) 
 
Finally, we should note Hoffmann’s early and steadfast opposition to the Iraq 
War. Jacques Chirac and Dominique de Villepin’s opposition to the 2003 Iraq War has 
been praised in retrospect as a sign of wisdom and moderation; however, most French 
strategists at the time were agnostic or skeptical of that attitude (See Bozo, 2017). 
Instead, Stanley Hoffmann was opposed to the war early on and expressed it in writing, 
in French first, in L’Amérique vraiment impériale (2003). The long interview that 
became the book took place as early as June 2003 (Hoffmann 2003:8) and was 
published in October, a year before the English version. In it, Hoffmann is also critical 
of the French officials for being too ambiguous about their opposition to this war.  
J’ai été également surpris par le manque de réaction du côté français. […] En réalité, l’attitude 
du gouvernement français a simplement consisté à […] s’en tenir à la diplomatie secrete. […] 
L’Ambassadeur de France, Jean-David Levitte, […] n’a commencé sa tournée d’explication 
qu’après la fin de la guerre elle-même. (2003:13). 
 
Hoffmann’s choice to write his review of Glucksmann’s book in French for 
Commentaire and to signal his opposition to the Iraq war in both French and English 
discussions of “imperial America” speaks to the second dimension we would like to 
highlight: his defense of a modality of research and teaching opposed to 
monolingualism and grand generalizations. 
 
 
A HUMANISTIC APPROACH TO THE SOCIAL SCIENCES 
The other contribution we wish to highlight here is Stanley Hoffmann’s commitment 
to the enduring value of the humanities. It seems clear that he observed the 
development of the modern social sciences in the United States with a certain sense 
of bemused detachment. His famous characterization of international relations as an 
‘American social science’ (1977) is still widely cited forty years after publication. (In an 
ironic gesture, given its critique of mainstream international relations, one could note 
that it has been cited more than 100 times since 2017 alone, and that its core 
insights are widely confirmed by leading international relations scholars, e.g., Waever 
1998; Walt 2011). Hoffmann’s article embodies a critique of two aspects of the 
discipline. The first aspect relates to its Americanness and hence the proximity to 
power.4 The second problem with international relations is associated with what 
Hoffmann perceived as its rather hubristic scientific ambitions, not least encapsulated 
in quantification and formalization (Hoffmann 1985: 14). 
As famously argued by Martin Hollis and Steve Smith (1990), the social sciences can 
be divided into two broad traditions. One of them is related to the rise of the natural 
sciences, or what they describe as the outsider’s view, akin to ‘a natural scientist 
seeking to explain the workings of nature’ (Hollis and Smith 1990: 1). This has been 
the dominant tradition in much US political science at least since the behavioral 
revolution in the middle of the twentieth century. The other tradition claims a nineteenth-
century historicist lineage, or the attempt to write history from the inside by uncovering 
the meanings attributed to events by historical actors themselves, as well as the notion 
of understanding (Verstehen) as first formulated by the German philosopher Wilhelm 
Dilthey. Keohane (2009) is right to highlight that Hoffmann’s work reflects elements of 
both approaches, including an awareness of many fundamental continuities of 
international relations (Keohane 2009: 370), but given the emphasis Hoffmann places 
on history and human agency, his empirical approach comes much closer to the 
second tradition. In his article about Raymond Aron’s contributions to international 
relations, Hoffmann approvingly discusses Aron’s assessment that ‘it is much more 
difficult than in the case of economic theory to separate such abstract theory or 
conceptualization from the concrete sociological and historical study, the logic of 
behavior from the specific characteristics of the actors. Only the concrete study can 
help make the behavior of the actors, their calculations of forces, and the stakes they 
give to their conflicts intelligible’ (Hoffmann 1985: 15). This calls for an approach 
privileging understanding, with great emphasis on analyzing particular actors, 
situations, goals, and constraints. It also accepts reasons as the main causes of action 
and is suspicious of unconscious causal forces that would reduce reasons to 
insignificant rationalizations (Hoffmann 1986: 8-9). Such choices explain Keohane’s 
assessment of Hoffmann’s critique as “modest” since it leaves existing power 
structures intact. 
It would be a mistake to conclude that Hoffmann was entirely hostile to generalization, 
but the generalizations he favored were of a bounded kind. Such generalizations relate 
to trends at a certain time or in a well-defined set of cases. This included 
generalizations about post-war France (Hoffmann 1963 and 1973) or the ‘post-Cold-
War world’, as in his influential ‘Clash of Globalizations’ (Hoffmann 2002), which was 
a response to Fukuyama (1989, 1992) and Huntington (1993, 1996), or his writings 
about the principal features of the global system or European integration in this period. 
While general theories can help clarify concepts, establish categories and raise 
important questions, Hoffmann suggests that most grand generalizations formulated 
by international-relations scholars are of limited value and need to be complemented 
with the analysis of specific countries and cases, which is essential to a proper 
understanding of international relations. 
In his classic article on International relations as an “American social science,” 
Hoffmann notes that the three international-relations books he would take to a desert 
island are – Thucydides (Peloponnesian War), Waltz (Man, the State and War) and 
Aron (Peace and War) (Hoffmann 1977: 51). It should be noted that the Waltz book 
mentioned here is not his later work, notably the Theory of International Politics (Waltz 
1979), which probably would have gone too far in the direction of deductive grand 
theory for Hoffmann’s taste (see the discussion in Hoffmann 1977: 52 on what would 
later be published as The Theory of International Politics). 
One of the problems of such generalizations is that they are too strongly determined 
by the particular position of the scholar who proposes them: determinations of historial 
conjuncture, geographical location, ideology, training, and language. This is where 
Stanley Hoffmann truly appears in his guise of the renaissance man: he would 
encourage learning foreign languages as a way of distancing oneself from one’s native 
cultural universe and as a step towards a more fruitful understanding of the other. The 
importance of distancing oneself is also visible in Hoffmann’s call for deep historical 
investigation (i.e. a distancing from one’s present conditions) as opposed to the 
instrumental use of the past as a large dataset which only has an illustrative value. His 
words should still resonate today: “American political scientists do not receive enough 
training either in history or in foreign languages, indispensable for work on past 
relations among states (Hoffmann 1977:57). This is consistent with what he admired 
in Aron and Thucydides: their historical and sociological sensitivities and their attention 
to the self-understanding of historical contemporaries in their own terms. This approach 
meant that Hoffmann distanced himself to some degree from some of his American 
colleagues, many of whom favored a more deductive approach to theorizing. Indeed, 
as he wrote about Aron in 1985, ‘even if one compares him with American specialists 
of international relations, Aron seems strikingly original’ (Hoffmann 1985: 13). 
Hoffmann’s approach is reflected in his studies of foreign policy. For example, his 
writings on French foreign policy under de Gaulle combine an awareness of various 
structural constraints, of the role of history and of the traumas of the 20th century, but 
 
4 Hoffmann had also identified the problematic US-centrism of political science naturalized as objectivity as early 
as 1957 (Hoffmann 1957: 920-921). 
also emphasize statesmanship and the creative strategies adopted to modify the 
international milieu and maximize France’s influence in the world (Hoffmann 1974: 
290). In later years Hoffmann deplored the limited attention his Harvard colleagues 
paid to the teaching of foreign policy: ‘Jargon has invaded everything and the 
relationship of theories to reality has faded. There are all these wonderful equations, 
but how are they affected by a real-world phenomenon like death? When I came to 
Harvard, American foreign policy was near the top of the hierarchy of subjects taught 
here. Today, there is no tenured government professor teaching American foreign 
policy. At present, the hierarchy of prestige values everything that is abstract and 
theoretical, and you cannot do that with foreign-policy studies. They have to be 
concrete and deal with concrete issues.’ (Lambert 2007) 
 
Conclusion 
Our article has highlighted how Stanley Hoffmann’s French-American biography and 
interest in both countries can be seen as reflected in his general approach to 
scholarship and public life. While he was a successful and influential American 
academic, he was in many ways closer to the traditional French ideal of scholarship 
and to liberal ideals of an intellectual. In his book on Duties Beyond Borders, Hoffmann 
addresses the role of the intellectual and states that ‘quite simply his duty is to 
dismantle prejudices, national self-righteousness, and parochial views, patiently and 
painstakingly, to protest constantly against inequity and violence, which is not very 
easy; it is to be the conscience of national society’ (Hoffmann 1981: 226). In his 
scholarship and public writings Hoffmann promoted such a nuanced understanding of 
countries, cultures and foreign policy-making, without calling for radical change in the 
power structures. 
In the current times, when the humanities are under threat in many countries, and 
policy-relevant research is either contemptuously disregarded or exclusively directed 
to policy elites, Hoffmann’s legacy of scholarship and public engagement is a powerful 
example. It manifests the strengths of a nuanced and humanistic approach to the study 
of society and global politics, beyond the demands of the policymaking elites of the day 
and bridges the roles of the scholar and public intellectual. This entails engaging with 
a wider audience and maintaining a necessary critical detachment from the corridors 
of power. Hoffmann’s scholarship also demonstrates how a humanistic approach that 
values the study of languages and history in an era of heightened scientific ambitions 
can provide a rich and nuanced understanding of politics and international relations 
that is a necessary prerequisite for such policy analysis. Even those who feel that 
courage today requires more than moderation and that existing power structures need 
to be challenged would be well advised not to give up on the two struggles of Stanley 
Hoffmann. 
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